The Rationality Uninformed Electorate: Some Experimental Evidence by Collier, Kenneth et al.
DIVISION OF THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 
CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 
PASADENA, CALIFORNIA 91125 
THE RATIONALITY UNINFORMED ELECTORATE: 
SOME EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE 
Kenneth Collier 
University of Texas at Austin 
Peter C. Ordeshook 
California Institute of Technology 
Kenneth Williams 
University of Texas at Austin 
This research was supported by a National 
Science Foundation grant to the University 
of Texas at Austin. We also wish to thank 
Peter Gray for preparing the network over 
which the experiments were conducted. 
SOCIAL SCIENCE WORKING PAPER 668) 
March 1988 
Abstract 
This essay reports on a series of twenty four election experiments in which voters 
are allowed to decide between voting retrospectively and purchasing contemporaneous 
information about the candidate challenging the incumbent. Each experiment consists of 
a series of election periods in which dummy candidates choose spatial positions which 
represent either their policy while in office or a promise about policy if elected. 
Subjects (voters) are told the value to them of the incumbent's policy, but they must 
decide, prior to voting, whether or not to purchase information about the value of the 
challenger's promise. In general, our data conform to reasonable expectations: voters 
purchase less information and rely more on retrospective knowledge when the candidates' 
strategies are stable, and their likelihood of purchasing information during periods of 
instability is tempered by the likelihood that their votes matter, by the reliability of the 
information available for purchase, and by the degree of instability as measured by 
changes in each voter's welfare. 
The Rationally Uninformed Electorate: Some Experimental Evidence 
A considerable empirical literature documents the low levels of information which 
characterize voters' knowledge of election issues and the candidates' positions on issues. 
Although such deficiencies are at odds with the assumptions of many of the formal 
theories of elections developed since Downs's [1957] seminal volume, an imperfectly 
informed electorate was not only anticipated by the Framers of the U.S. Constitution, 
but, in retrospect, seems a reasonable response to the costs of information and to the 
improbability in most elections that one's vote is decisive. That is, the expected utility 
loss of casting a ballot based on erroneous beliefs is insignificant, especially when it is 
compared to the net cost of aspiring to the ideal of the fully informed citizen. 
Correspondingly, voters reduce information costs by basing their decisions on 
retrospective evaluations, coupled with a variety of contemporaneous cues such as the 
candidates' party labels, interest group endorsements, and mass media reports on the 
candidates' personalities and lifestyles. As Popkin as his co-researchers (1976) summarize 
the matter (p. 787): "Most voters will only learn enough to form a very generalized 
notion of the position of a particular candidate or party on some issues ... [and] the 
investor-voter will use partisan and ideological labels as practical solutions to the 
problems of costly information." 
Although retrospective evaluations and cues probably admit significant opportunities 
for erroneous judgments, they achieve a closer match between the costs of error and of 
information. Moreover, we can interpret the electorate's reliance on indirect sources of 
information as "systemically rational" in the sense that the long run equilibrium 
strategies for candidates in such electorates correspond, under various general conditions, 
to the median voter's preference if such a preference exists (McKelvey and Ordeshook, 
1986, Collier et al, 1987). Since the median prevails theoretically with a perfectly 
informed electorate, there is no social cost associated with the use of cues, and 
evaluations based on retrospective judgments of the candidates and their parties: hence 
the notion of "systemic rationality." 
We should not interpret arguments about the systemic rationality of democratic 
processes to mean, however, that patterns of information are irrelevant. Circumstances 
exist under which the electorate's incomplete information yield different outcomes than 
what prevails under complete information, and the processes whereby candidates and 
voters adjust to each other may be sufficiently slowed by incomplete information which 
no equilibrium is ever achieved (McKelvey and Ordeshook, 1985). Thus, it is important 
that we understand the relationship between a citizen's propensity to gather information 
and the parameters which characterize elections. To this end, we report here on a 
series of twenty four experiments in which voters (subjects) must decide whether or not 
to buy information about the challenger to an incumbent and thus they must choose 
between becoming informed -- between learning the promises of challenging candidates --
and voting retrospectively -- voting on the basis of the incumbent's performance. 
Although we do not offer a general calculus for a voter's decisions, our general 
conclusions match reasonable hypotheses: the likelihood of buying information increases if 
such information is a reliable indicator of what challengers do once elected, if one's vote 
is likely to matter, if the voter experiences a sudden change in his or her welfare, and 
if it is "reasonable" for a voter to contemplate switching loyalties to another candidate. 
And, in the aggregate, our data exhibit several suggestive and interesting patterns: 
Increased loyalty to one candidate or the other is accompanied by a decreased propensity 
to purchase information; instability in candidate strategies increases this propensity; and 
the proportion of voters purchasing information is negatively correlated with the 
proportion voting "incorrectly." To the extent, then, that our experiments offer 
subjects a decision problem similar to the one voters confront in actual elections, our 
results suggest that we should not be surprised to observe electorates which invest few 
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resources in political information, especially if no great issues arise to upset the kind of 
equilibrium which is likely to prevail in stable democracies in which the imperatives of 
Median Voter Theorem apply. One the other hand, there is much idiosyncratic behavior 
-- some identically situated voters buy information in almost every election, some never 
become informed, and some buy information on a seemingly random basis. 
Section 1 of this essay describes our experimental procedures and offers more detail 
about the voters' decision environment. Section 2 discusses some general patterns in the 
data, whereas Section 3 provides a more thorough analysis in which we try to explain 
decisions about information on the basis of experimental parameters. 
1. Experimental Design
Each experiment consists of a series of election periods (34 plus an initial period).1 
In each period the incumbent chooses an issue position -- a number between 0 and 999 -
- which is transformed, via a single peaked utility function, into a payoff for each of 
five voters. In all experiments, the voter's ideals are at 400, 250, 775, 400, and 830. At 
the maximum, each voter earns 16 "Franks," which is translated into actual payoffs at 
the rate of two cents per Frank (all subjects learn the exchange rate at the beginning of 
the experiment, but they are not informed about their ideal points, or even that the 
candidates' strategies consist of positions on some line), and payoffs decline to zero at 
the rate of .02 Franks/unit as a policy moves in either direction away from the voter's 
ideal. Each voter learns his or her payoff from the incumbent's policy, but not the 
policy. The challenging candidate, on the other hand, selects a position which ostensibly 
represents the policy he or she would have adopted if in office, but the value of this 
1 Excepting those instances, however, in which time expired or the network over
which the experiments were conducted crashed. The number of election periods per 
session are as follows: For promises not kept, ex. 1: 34,34,29,34,34,27; for ex. 2: 
34,34,34,34,32,34. For promises kept, ex. 1: 34,34,31,34,34,34; for ex. 2: 29,34,34,32,34,34. 
3 
position is not reported to the voters. Instead, after learning the value of the 
incumbent's policy, each voter must decide whether or not to purchase information about 
the value of the challenger's promise. This cost, equal in all experiments to 1 Frank is 
deducted from the subject's payoff, and all voters must then choose between retaining 
the incumbent or electing the challenger. The vote totals are reported to all voters, but 
no voter learns who voted for whom, how many voters purchased information, or the 
payoffs to other voters. The election winner becomes the new incumbent, and the 
process is repeated. (The experiment is initialized in period 0 by choosing the incumbent 
randomly. After the incumbent selects a position and its payoff value is reported to the 
voters, the voters decide whether to retain this person as the incumbent for period 1. 
The challenger's makes no promise in this initial period.) 
The form of these experiments is similar, then, to the ones which Collier et al 
(1987) review in their study of retrospective voting. Owing to our research interests, 
however, we introduce two important differences in experimental design. First, by not 
allowing voters to purchase information about challengers, Collier et  al force voters to 
choose retrospectively. Such a procedure is warranted if we want to learn whether 
retrospective voting induces the candidates to choose median policy positions, but 
presently we are interested in learning whether or under what conditions voters will 
actually choose to act retrospectively -- the circumstances under which they will forgo 
the opportunity to be informed about contemporaneous data and will choose instead to 
act on the basis of the candidates' past performances. Second, given our focus on voter 
as against candidate decisions, our experiments use dummy candidates. Although voters 
are led to believe that the candidates are real subjects, the actual policy positions of the 
candidates are predetermined at the beginning of the experiment in order to facilitate 
testing certain hypotheses about voting. 
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Subjects were mostly undergraduates untrained in spatial models of elections 
enrolled in Freshman and Sophomore introductory courses. At the beginning of each 
experiment, the five "real" subjects were designated as voters and two "shills" (usually 
graduate students from the department) were assigned the role of candidates. Subjects 
were informed that the experiment would be conducted entirely over a network linking 
computer terminals. Each voter and each candidate sat at a separate terminal (subjects 
were told that the candidates' terminals were in adjoining rooms) and all communication 
occurred over the network. No other communication was permitted. After reading the 
instructions (see Appendix), the two candidates were asked to leave the room containing 
the voters' terminals. A 5-period trial session familiarized subjects with their task. At 
the termination of the first experiment, a second was run using a different sequence of 
candidate positions. 
We report on a total of twelve experimental sessions, or twenty four experiments. 
In six sessions, unless the candidates are in equilibrium or "near"-equilibrium with respect 
to the electorate's median preference, a promise bears no necessary relationship to the 
policy the challenger chooses if elected. In the other six sessions, challengers always 
keep their promises (no subject was allowed to participate in both types of experiments, 
and with but one exception, subjects were all "inexperienced"). Thus, information is 
considerably less valuable in the first six sessions, so if subjects respond rationally to 
the value of information, we anticipate that more information will be bought in the 
second series.2 The first experiment within a session has the two candidates slowly 
converging to positions near the electorate's median preference (one candidate converges 
to the median, 400, and the other to the point 390), remaining at those positions until 
2 We emphasize that information is not entirely worthless in the first six session 
since promises correspond to selected position when the candidates positions are 
temporally stable. We can hypothesize, then, that the difference we report here between 
the two series of experiments would be magnified considerably if promises where entirely 
unrelated to positions. 
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the 29th period, and fluctuating wildly once again until the experiment's termination. 
Figure l shows the sequence of candidate positions, which also serve as promises for the 
challenger. Hence, in election period 4, for example, suppose the incumbent is candidate 
l and the challenger is 2. The incumbent, 1, chooses 400, and 2 promises 600. If 2 is 
elected, 2 then chooses 900 and l promises 750. Notice, then, that 2's promise is 
unreliable except in those periods when the candidates' positions are stable (periods 17 -
29). In the second experiment of each series (see Figure 2), the candidates converge 
more rapidly towards the median until the 20th period, at which time they fluctuate for 
a few periods, and converge identically to the new point 690. This experiment also ends 
with a few periods of instability. Figures 3 and 4 graph the candidates' promises for the 
second series of six experimental sessions -- promises which candidates must keep if 
elected. Hence, referring to Figure 3, if in period 4, for example, candidate l is the 
incumbent at 250 (his promise in period 3) and 2 is the challenger promising 600, then if 
2 is elected, 2 must choose 600 and 1 promises 750; but if l is reelected, l chooses 400 
and 2 promises 900 (to disequilibrate strategies and accomplish the "strategic shift" more 
rapidly in experiment 2 of this series, the incumbent chooses 900 in period 21 if he is 
candidate l and 100 if he is candidate 2).3 
2. Basic Hypotheses
It seems self-evident that voters will buy information only if they believe that its 
value exceeds its cost. Transforming this supposition into an formalized and testable 
decision rule, however, is difficult since it may imply different things for different 
people. Risk aceptant voters, for example, might purchase information in environments in 
which candidates rarely change positions to protect against the possibility that the 
3 If candidate l (•) is the initial incumbent and thereby makes no promise, then 
that candidate chooses 550 in period l; if candidate 2 (o) is the initial incumbent, it 
chooses 800. 
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challenger has found a better policy; risk averse voters might never purchase information; 
and voters which form high subjective probability estimates of their decisiveness should 
be more willing to purchase information than voters with low subjective estimates. 
Nevertheless, despite the possible variation in the decision calculus which might 
characterize voters, several hypotheses are consistent with our basic supposition and can 
be tested with our experimental data. 
Our first hypothesis is based on the simple premise that if voters believe that 
incumbents will act as they have in the past because the strategies of both candidates 
are temporally stable, then there is little reason to purchase information. 
Hl: voters should be less likely to purchase information if the 
candidates' strategies are stable. Conversely, voters should be more 
likely to purchase information if the candidate's positions are 
unstable and likely to change from period to period. 
This hypothesis is important, because it suggests that a poorly informed electorate -- an 
electorate which pays little heed to the contemporaneous utterances of candidates -- may 
not indicate any basic defect in democratic institutions: indeed, it suggests that such low 
levels of information may merely signal a stable democratic system in which voters do 
not anticipate that either party will nominate candidates which depart greatly from long­
term equilibrium strategies. 
Our second hypothesis summarizes the idea that voters should purchase information 
only if they believe that their votes are likely to be relevant to the determination of the 
election winner. Otherwise, becoming informed about politics is akin to becoming 
informed about baseball batting averages -- a widespread hobby certainly, but not one 
which is undertaken to influence events. Political information, in this instance, is the 
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consumable commodity, rather than the candidates' policies. Presumably, however, the 
hobbyists are a constant in society (or at least in an given experiment), so 
H2: voters should be less likely to purchase information if their vote 
is unlikely to be decisive. 
Finally, if voters learn that information provides little basis for predicting the 
performance of candidates, then presumably any purchase is unwise. Hence, 
H3: voters should be more likely to purchase information the greater 
the reliability of that information -- in this instance, for those 
experiments in which challengers necessarily keep their promises. 
Indeed, we can add as a corollary to this hypothesis the proposition that whenever 
information is worthless, hypotheses HI and H2 are irrelevant, because they implicitly 
suppose that information conveys something useful about alternatives and the future. 
Thus, variables such as the plurality of victorious candidates and the variability of 
candidate positions should count for less in our first set of experiments. 
We prefer, of course, to give these hypotheses a firmer theoretical foundation by 
deducing them from some explicitly stated model of a voter's decision calculus. But even 
a simplified model reveals the considerable latitude in alternative formulations and, as 
our data confirm, the opportunities for idiosyncratic behavior. To see this, let I denote 
the payoff from the incumbent, and let voters regard this number as an indicator of 
what they are likely to get if the incumbent is reelected. Suppose the payoff from the 
challenger is either C or C', where C < I < C', and let the voter believe that C occurs 
with probability p and C' with probability 1-p. More generally, we should regard C and 
C' as conditional expectations: C, for instance, is the expected value of the challenger's 
.Promise, given that the promise's value is less than I, which occurs with probability p. 
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Finally, let Co be the cost of information, and, to simplify matters, let the voter 
condition his actions on being decisive -- let the victorious candidate be determined 
solely by this voter's vote. The voter, now confronts a two-stage decision: whether to 
purchase information, and for whom to vote. If the information is bought, the voter 
receives I - Co if C is revealed as the challenger's payoff, or C' - Co if C' is revealed, 
so the expected value of buying is pl+ (1-p)C' - Co. Without information the voter 
chooses the incumbent if I > pC + (1-p)C', and he chooses the challenger if this 
inequality is reversed. Suppose, first, that the voter, if he does not purchase 
information, intends to vote for the incumbent. Believing that I> pC + (1-p)C', the 
voter secures information if and only if I < pl+ (1-p)C' - Co. This second inequality 
requires that C' - I > Co/(1-p), whereas the first inequality requires that C' - I < p(C' -
C), so p(C' - C) > Co/(1-p), or simply 
C' - C > Co/[p(l -p)] (1) 
Alternatively, if the voter intends to vote for the challenger if no information is 
purchased -- if I< pC + (1-p)C' -- the purchase is made if and only if pC + (1-p)C' < 
pl + (1-p)C' - Co, which requires that I - C > Co/p, and which, when combined with the 
first inequality, yields expression ( 1) again. This expression clearly implies that the 
likelihood of purchasing information declines as Co increases, but this consequence is 
trivial. Confounding the identification of additional consequences, however, is the fact 
that, because C and C' are conditional expectations, C' - C and p(l -p) are linked by the 
structural form of the voter's uncertainty. For example, if the voter believes that the 
payoff from the challenger is given by a stationary uniform density centered at I, and if 
the voter confronts a change in I to some extreme value, say I', then p(l -p) decreases 
whereas C' - C remains constant, so the likelihood of purchasing information decreases 
as well. Conversely, if the extreme value I' is the initial payoff, which changes suddenly 
to I, C' - C again remains constant, p(l -p) increases, and the purchase of information 
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becomes more likely. Thus, payoff changes from less to more extreme values decrease 
the likelihood of purchasing information, and changes in the other direction -- from 
extreme to more moderate values -- reverse this likelihood's direction of change. 
One inference to be drawl/- from these facts is that if a voter does not initially 
anticipate changing his or her vote because the incumbent's performance is so poor or so 
good relative to expectations about the challenger, but if a sudden change in incumbent's 
performance is observed, then the likelihood of purchasing of information should increase. 
Stated as an empirical hypothesis, 
H4: A decline in loyalty, as occasioned by a change in payoff from 
the incumbent, will be accompanied by an increased likelihood of 
purchasing information about the challenger. 
This hypothesis should be treated carefully, since its analytic justification makes 
strong use of the uniform density's properties. Indeed, not only might other densities 
yield a different relationship between C' - C and p(l -p), but even if we use the uniform 
density for analytic tractability, its mean and variance remain subjective parameters 
which can occasion idiosyncratic behavior. Voters who believe that the challenger is 
most likely to yield payoffs which are clearly superior or inferior to the incumbent will 
react differently to a change in the incumbent's performance than voters who regard the 
two candidates as equivalent on average. Also, our model is too simple to represent the 
complex decisions which actually confront subjects. It treats one candidate, the 
incumbent, as a certain alternative and, thus, it does not make any accommodation for 
the changes in priors which might occur whenever the payoff from an incumbent 
suddenly changes; moreover it does not consider the possibility that the uncertainty 
about the challenger changes over time in a coherent way based on the information 
which the voter gathers. The empirical analysis which follows, then, should be 
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interpreted less as the testing of a specific model of voter decision making and more as 
an exploratory mission into the kinds of correlations in information gathering and 
candidate choice which we are likely to find in actual elections. 
2. Summary Statistics and General Observations 
Beginning with some general summary statistics and patterns in the data, the most 
general fact concerns the number of voters who purchase information. Overall across all 
experiments, the average number of purchases per election period is 1.92 with a standard 
deviation of 1.23. Table 1 breaks this average down by experimental type, and also 
reports the standard deviation of this average, the average payoff difference between the 
incumbent's policy and the challenger's promise, and the aggregate number of election 
periods across all experiments of each type. 
Table I: Aggregate Summary Data 
Avg. # buying 
std. dev. 
Avg. payoff diff. 
# of periods 
promises not kept 
Exp. #l 
1.77 
1.22 
1.98 
192 
Exp. #2 
1.44 
1.06 
2.55 
202 
promises kept 
Exp. #l 
2.38 
1.22 
2.21 
201 
Exp. #2 
2.12 
1.17 
1.96 
197 
Several tentative conclusions can be drawn from these numbers, but the most striking 
fact is that for no type of experiment does the average number buying exceed one-half 
of the electorate, which is interesting given that the cost of information (I Frank) is 
significantly less than the average payoff to voters in each period (approximately 11 
Franks). Indeed, this cost equals only one half the cost of the average difference in 
payoffs associated with the incumbent's policy and the challenger's promise. Thus, voters 
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generally appear to decide retrospectively even though the cost of information is less 
than the average potential cost of electing the wrong candidate (but not necessarily less 
than the cost of an incorrect ballot since than ballot may not be decisive). Comparing 
the averages by experiment type, moreover, offers the first bit of evidence in support of 
hypothesis H3: voters purchase more information on average when challengers necessarily 
keep their promises than when they do so only in periods of stable strategies. 
No mean in Table 1, though, is significantly different from any other, which stems 
from the fact that although the means differ in an anticipated way, they disguise much 
variation within and across experiments. As a partial view into this variation, Figures Sa 
- Sd graph the proportion of voters purchasing information by period. These figures 
show some of the variation which yields the large standard deviations for the overall 
averages which Table 1 reports. A closer inspection of these figures suggests, 
nevertheless, that our data, at least for this aggregate level of analysis, are consistent 
with the first hypothesis, HI. Notice that in Figures Sa and 5c, the trend in average 
purchases is negative up to periods 29 and 30 respectively -- up to the period in which, 
after nearly converging, the candidates once again fluctuate wildly, at which point the 
average number of purchases increases sharply. Similarly, this trend is negative in 
Figures 5b and 5d up to periods 19, after which the candidates again fluctuate wildly and 
average purchases increase sharply. Moreover, to see from these data that subjects are 
responding to the value of information, Figures 6a and 6b graph the trend in proportion 
buying through the initial periods of unstable candidate positions (through period 15 in 
the first experiment in a session, and through period 8 in the second experiment). 
Notice that if promises are kept, the decline in proportion over time is slight, whereas 
this decline is accentuated if promises are not kept. Indeed, consistent with the 
supposition that "experienced" subjects will more quickly learn the value of information, 
this decline is greatest in the second experiment if promises are not kept. 
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Disaggregating the data by election period continues nevertheless to obscure the 
considerable variation across experiments and subjects. The average voter, for example, 
purchases information 39 percent of the time, but the standard deviation of this average 
is 26. Three of 120 persons never make a purchase, and three make purchases on every 
occasion. To see this differently, Table 2 reports the correlations in these decisions 
among voters, as well as their ideal points. Notice, in particular, that voters I and 4 
share the same ideal, and thus they confront an identical decision problem (except to the 
extent that that problem is altered by different patterns of earlier information-purchasing 
decisions). Nevertheless and despite the fact that the correlations in their decisions in 
the highest among any pair of voter types, this correlation is only .192. Similarly, 
although voters 3 and 5 share nearly identical ideal points, so that they also share a 
decision problem in those instances in which both candidates choose policies to the left 
of 775 (all but one instance in the first experiment of a session, and all but a maximum 
of three instances in the second experiment), their decisions correlate only .043. 
Table 2: Correlations of buying decisions among voters 
vi at 400 v2 at 250 v3 at 775 v4 at 400 v5 at 830 
vi 
v2 -.003 
v3 -.048 .002 
v4 .192 .128 .104 
v5 .000 .156 .043 .098 
Not only do the decisions of similar voter types fail to correlate, but there is no 
significant relationship between a voter's ideal and his or her propensity to purchase 
information. Voters with ideal points at 400 purchase information 43 percent of the 
time; those at 250 purchase information 37 percent of the time; at 775, 37%; and at 830, 
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42%. If we look at only the first experiments in a session -- those in which the 
candidates vary their positions about or converge to the median, these percentages 
become 44%; 44%; 40%; and 46%, respectively. This pattern appears to contradict Palfrey 
and Pool's [1986] conclusion that "Informed voters tend to be located at the extreme of 
the political spectrum. Uninformed voters tend to be in the center (p. 12)." And even 
if we keep in mind that these percentages measure only the decision to purchase 
information and not the accuracy of beliefs about candidates, another aggregate measure 
suggests that accuracy of beliefs does not correlate either with the location of a voter's 
ideal. Overall, voters with ideal points at 400 make "correct" decisions -- decisions in 
which voters choose the incumbent if the incumbent's policy is worth more than the 
value of the challenger's promise (which may or may not be known to the voter, 
depending on whether information is purchased) -- 59 percent of the time; at 250, 49%; 
at 775, 58% and at 830, 54%. For those experiments in which challengers keep their 
promises, these averages are 58%, 53%, 65%, and 63%, respectively. (These percentages are 
not significantly different from the results of random decisions, but we see later that 
these errors are not distributed randomly.) 
General statistical summaries, however, do not allow us to answer several important 
questions. Does the sharp rise in purchases which occur when candidates depart from 
stable positions support hypothesis HI or is it merely a statistical artifact? Are the 
negative trends which Figures 5a - 5d portray and which we suggest are occasioned by 
candidate convergence, merely indicative of a general tendency for subjects to purchase 
less information as each experiment proceeds? If voters react at all to payoff changes, 
do they react more to negative as against positive changes? Are voters more sensitive 
to parameters when challenger's keep their promises than when they do not do so? Our 
analysis in the next section seeks answers to such questions. 
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Figure 3: Candidate Promises 
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Figure 5c: Proportion Buying 
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3. Testing the Hypotheses
Our analysis focuses now on some simple regressions in which we first partially 
disagregate the data by experiment and election period. Within each election and period, 
we have this data: the period, each voter's payoff change from the incumbent, the 
previous plurality of the incumbent (pl), and the number of voters purchasing 
information. If we compute for each period the average of positive payoff changes (ppc), 
and the average of negative changes (npc), we can run the regression for each 
experiment type which Table 3 summarizes. This table also reports the regressions which 
result when all experiments are pooled, and dummy variables (di - d23) distinguish each 
of the twenty four experiments. In this and in all subsequent tables, standard errors are 
in parenthesis, • denotes coefficients significant at .I, and •• denotes coefficients 
significant at .05 or less. 
Table 3: Regressions by Experiment and Period 
promises not kept promises kept pooled with dummies 
const. 1.839 (.164)** 2.644 (.170)** 2.685 (.204)** 
period -.018 (.006)** -.020 (.006)** -.020 (.004)** 
ppc .006 (.011) .042 (.Oil )** .019 (.007)** 
npc .034 (.Oil)** .001 (.019) .014 (.006)** 
pl -.040 (.038) -.l l 5  (.040)** -.044 (.026)* 
di - d23 14 of 23 sig. 
diff. from 0 
n 382 386 768 
adj. R2 .06 .12 .35 
std. error 1.114 1.128 .989 
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The results Table 3 reports warrant several comments. First, the sharp increase in 
adjusted R2 when dummy variables are added for each experiment and the fact that 14 of 
23 dummy estimates differ significantly from zero (at .05) are indicative of the 
idiosyncratic behavior which subjects exhibit, and the difference in average purchases 
depending on whether challengers keep promises. Second, except for the intercept and 
for increases in payoff (ppc ), we cannot assert that coefficients are significantly 
different across the two experiment types -- although, with the exception of npc, the 
magnitudes of the coefficients for those experiments in which challengers keep promises 
are consistently greater. The coefficient for pl is significant when promises are kept, 
but it is insignificant and smaller when promises are irrelevant to future candidate 
positions. Thus, not only do subjects respond to the value of information by purchasing 
more when information has predictive value (notice the difference in the constant terms),
but, in accord with hypothesis H2, increases in plurality tends to decrease purchases -­
voters are less likely to purchase information if they believe that their vote is not likely 
to be decisive -- and, in accord with hypothesis H3, the relevance of plurality is greatest 
when promises are kept. The negative coefficient on "period" indicates that, even if we 
take the gradual convergence of candidates into account (via declines in ppc and npc), 
there is a general trend toward the purchase of less information as each experiment
proceeds. Hence, subjects appear to be learning how to vote retrospectively. The on:e 
apparent anomaly which Table 3 reports is that the coefficient for ppc but not for npc is 
significant if promises are kept, whereas exactly the opposite is true if promises are not 
kept. We might offer alternative speculations to account for this difference, but this 
difference disappears when we examine estimates using data at the individual level. 
Our suggestion that voters learn to act retrospectively leads to � seemingly 
paradoxical yet logical fact -- the correlation between the percentage of subjects voting 
correctly in an election and the percentage of voters purchasing information is negative. 
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To see this pattern graphically, consider Figures 7a and 7b, which show the proportion of 
subjects "voting incorrectly" -- the proportion voting for the incumbent if the 
incumbent's policy is worth less than the challenger's promise and for the challenger if 
the promise is worth less than the incumbent's policy -- for the first experiment in each 
series (since the candidates in the first but not the second experiment uniformly choose 
or promise distinct positions). Notice the decline in incorrect voting up to period 29, at 
which point the proportion of incorrect votes increases dramatically, since it is in this 
period that the candidates depart from their stable strategies. But Figures Sa and Sc, 
which graph the number of voters purchasing information, look quite similar to 7a and 
7b, respectively -- hence the negative correlation. This correlation does not mean that 
if we possessed a measure of voter beliefs about candidates, we would find our measure 
correlating negatively with information purchases, since the stability of strategies from 
periods 16 to 29 should provide voters with a basis for establishing reliable beliefs, for 
choosing retrospectively, and, thus, for dispensing with direct purchases of information. 
And although our experiments abstract greatly from real election processes, we suspect 
nevertheless that the most prominent empirical manifestation of this correlation is the 
emergence of partisan as against "issue" voting in stable electoral systems -- in systems 
in which both the general issues which concern voters and the policy prejudices of the 
parties and their nominees remain relatively constant. 
Disaggregating our data to individual subject observations tells much the same story 
as Table 3, although we must now use probit for our dichotomous dependent variable --
whether or not a subject buys information. Table 4 summarizes our results using these 
dependent variables: absolute change in payoff, ape; a variable indicating the sign of the 
payoff change, sgn pc (virtually no change occurs in the estimates of other coefficients 
if we use the single variable, payoff change, in lieu of ape and sgn pc); the magnitude of 
the plurality which the incumbent enjoyed in the previous election, pl; the election 
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period, period; and, when we pool all experiments, a dummy to differentiate between 
experiments in which challengers keep their promises (dO = I )  and those in which they 
do not do so (dO = 0). Aside from the fact that all coefficients have the signs 
anticipated by hypotheses Hl and H2, notice that both the magnitude and the significance 
of the coefficients for ape and pl are appreciably less for those experiments in which 
promises are not kept. Although there is a clear trend .for the purchase of less 
information in experiments of both types as an experiment proceeds (the negative and 
significant coefficient for "period"), those variables which we might reasonably anticipate 
entering an expected value calculation about the utility of information -- ape and pl --
are significantly different from 0 at .05 only if that information has value. This is the 
result which hypothesis HJ anticipates. To test for income effects, adding the magnitude 
of a subject's payoff as a variable changes the coefficient for other variables 
insignificantly and does not change any of our qualitative conclusions, and itself has an 
insignificant coefficient. Thus, we can reject the hypothesis of such an effect. 
Table 4: Individual problt results for buying information 
promises not kept promises kept pooled 
const. -.251 (.084) .. . 138 (.083) -.237 (.063) .. 
period -.011 (.003)** -.012 (.003)** -.012 (.002)** 
ape .013 (.009) .040 (.009)** .027 (.006)** 
sgn pc -.278 (.040)** -.103 (.038)** -.186 (.028)** 
pl -.032 (.020) -.060 (.020)** -.043 (.014)** 
dO .366 (.042)** 
n 1910 1930 3840 
LLf diff. 168 38 199 
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Figure 8c: Proportion Loyal vs Buying 
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Figure 8d: Proportion Loyal vs Buying 
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Finally, notice that although the coefficient for the sign of payoff changes is 
significant and negative for both sets of experiments -- subjects are more likely to 
purchase information when they experience decreases in payoffs than when their payoffs 
rise -- the coefficient is significantly smaller if promises are kept. The simple decision 
calculus which we offer in Section 2, however, predicts that payoff changes have 
symmetric effects, and, thus, a significant coefficient for sgn. pc is at odds with that 
model. Closer inspection of Figures 5b and 5d, though, suggest an extension of the 
analysis which Table 4 summarizes and which brings our conclusions about this 
coefficient more in line with theoretical predictions. 
Recall that, in a session's second experiment, the candidates, after converging to 
4!0, disequilibrate in period 20 for several rounds, converge to 690, and then, after seven 
rounds, disequilibriate again. The data in Figures 5b and 5d suggest, but only dimly, that 
voters increase their purchases of information during the two eras of disequilibrium and 
decrease their purchases when the candidates converge in the interim. In light of 
hypothesis H3, however, we are especially interested in ascertaining whether voters 
respond appropriately to the fact that promises are. meaningless for the experiments 
which Figure 5b summarizes, but predictive for the experiments summarized by Figure 5d. 
Consistent with this hypothesis is the fact that forty percent of the electorate buys 
information in these periods if the candidates keep their promises, whereas only twenty 
nine percent make similar purchases if the candidate's do not keep their promises. 
Further, the probit estimates which Table 5 reports reveals that the variables which 
hypotheses HI and H2 identify are relevant to decisions only when promises are kept: 
although neither the coefficient for ape nor the one for pl are significant at even the . I 
level when promises are not kept, both are significant when promises are kept. 
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Table 5: Problt results for periods 20-34, exp. #2 
promises not kept promises kept 
const. .102 (.434) .135 (.426) 
period -.024 (.016)• -.013 (.015) 
ape . 005 (.018) .035 (.016) .. 
sgn. pc -.336 (.086)° -.129 (.082) 
pl -.016 (.045) -.073 (.044)• 
n 440 415 
LLf dif. 50 13 
Finally, looking at the coefficient for sgn. pc when promises are kept, the inference 
we draw is that "experienced" subjects -- those who have participated in one and a half 
experiments -- respond equally to positive and negative payoff changes. Although the 
coefficient we estimate for this variable remains negative, it is not significantly different 
from zero, as it is if promises are not kept and as it is for both type of experiments 
overall (see Table 4). And it is this symmetric response which is consistent with our 
model in Section 2. 
There is one final pattern in our data, illustrated in Figures Sa - d, which is 
maintained regardless of how we aggregate that data and which bears on our fourth 
hypothesis, about loyalty and information. These figures add to Figure 5a - d, 
respectively, the frequency with which subjects vote for the same candidate as they 
voted for in the previous election (and the trend lines for this data), and they document 
the increasing degree of "loyalty" as the candidates converge which accompanies the 
decreasing propensity to purchase information, up to the point which the candidates' 
strategies diverge. Thus, we observe overall a negative correlation between loyalty and 
information purchases. 
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Naturally, we should be concerned that this correlation can be accounted for by the 
fact that loyalty and the likelihood of buying information correlate with the same 
variables -- notably the election period (period), the absolute change in a voter's payoff 
(ape), and the previous plurality of the incumbent (pl). The probit results which Table 6 
reports, however, show that, although the effects of period, ape, and pl are in general 
significant and of the appropriate signs (loyalty increases as an experiment proceeds, 
decreases with sudden changes in payoff, and increases as previous election margins 
increase), the decision to buy information has a uniformly significant independent effect 
on a subject's degree of loyalty and, in particular, buying information decreases one's 
chances of remaining loyal. 
Table 6: IndMdual Problt Results for Loyalty 
promises not kept promises kept pooled 
const. .307 (.091 )** .387 (.093)** .352 (.065)** 
period .002 (.003) .010 (.003)** .006 (.002)** 
buy -.173 (.068)** -.200 (.062)** -.184 (.045)** 
ape -.066 (.009)** -.047 (.009)** -.057 (.006)** 
sgn. pc. -.104 (.041)** -.247 (.040)** -.181 (.028)** 
pl .199 (.022)** .199 (.022)** .149 (.016)** 
LLf diff. 289 230 507 
4. Conclusions
Our experimental data confirm the supposition that voters purchase less information 
and rely more on retrospective knowledge when the candidates' strategies are stable. 
Their likelihood of purchasing information during periods of instability, however, is 
tempered by the likelihood that their votes matter, by the reliability of the information 
available for purchase, and by the degree of instability as measured by changes in 
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welfare. Aside from these correlations, individual decisions also appear to be 
idiosyncratic. Despite the statistical significance of our estimated parameters, variances 
explained, even when we aggregate the data in various ways, remain low by most 
standards (the highest adjusted R2 reported for any regression, in Table 3, is only .34). 
Raising the stakes in an election might reduce unexplained variance considerably, but we 
should als9 be prepared to think of political information as a consumption good, t1he 
purchase of which is determined as much by taste as by a rational calculation based on 
the character of an election. 
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Appendix: Instructions 
This experiment is a study of voting in elections. As subjects you will each be assigned 
to be either a voter or a candidate, and you will each be paid for your participation on 
the basis of the decisions which you make. If you are careful and make good decisions, 
you can make a substantial amount of money. However, the payoffs in the experiment 
are not necessarily fair. Your payoff depends partly on your decisions, partly on the 
decisions of others, and partly on chance. The experiment uses computer terminals, and 
when we begin you will each be assigned to a terminal. The entire experiment will take 
place through a network connecting the terminals. 
In this experiment, there are two candidates, A and B, and the rest of you are 
voters. The experiment is divided into a number of election periods, and each period 
consists of six steps. Except in the first period when the initial incumbent is chosen 
randomly, the voters first all vote whether to elect candidate I or 2 -- that is, whether 
to make I or 2 the incumbent for that period. Second, the vote is tallied and 
announced, and the winning candidate becomes the "incumbent" for that period. Third, 
both the incumbent and the challenger each choose an election strategy. For the 
incumbent, that strategy represents his policy for his term in office. The challenger's 
strategy, on the other hand, serves merely as that person's promise about what he or she 
might do if elected. Voters do not learn either the incumbent's or the challenger's 
strategy. Instead, in the Fourth stage, voters are told what the incumbent's policy is 
worth to them. This payoff is presented in "Franks", which can be exchanged for dollars 
at the end of the experiment. After the incumbent adopts his policy, and the challenger 
his promise, the computer computes how much each policy is worth to each voter, and 
the value of the incumbent's policy is displayed on the voter's terminal and is also added 
to the cumulative total earned by the voter. Fifth, after learning the value of the 
incumbent's policy, each voter must decide whether or not to buy information about the 
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opponent's promise. If this information is purchased, that voter will have the fixed 
amount of 2 Franks deducted from his or her final payoff. Finally, if a voter indicates 
that he or she wishes to buy information about the challenger, the value of the 
challenger's promise is revealed to that voter. Thus, if information is purchased, the 
value of the challenger's promise along with the value of the incumbent's policy are 
revealed to the voter. But if no information is purchased, only the value of the 
incumbent's policy is revealed. 
At this point, the period will end, and a new election will take place. The voters 
must then decide whether to keep the incumbent in office for another period, or to elect 
the challenger. If the incumbent is reelected, he or she must again choose a policy. 
Whether this policy is the same as their previous policy is up to the incumbent. And if 
the challenger is elected, the challenger's policy need not correspond to that person's 
prior promise to the electorate -- again, no constraints are placed on the candidates' 
policies once they become incumbents. 
Summarizing, an election period consists of (I ) voting, (2) announcement of the 
winner; (3) selection of policies by the incumbent and the challenger; (4) revelation of 
the value of the incumbent's policy to the voters; (5) the voter's decision whether or not 
to purchase information about the challenger; (6) revelation of this information to those 
who purchase it. We note that a voter's payoff in a given period does not depend on 
who you that person voted for, but only on the policy adopted by the current incumbent. 
Thus, if 1 is elected, and if I adopts a policy which gives you 4.50, then you receive 
that amount regardless of whether you voted for 1 or 2 -- less, of course, the cost of 
information if you chose to purchase information. Your vote can affect who is elected, 
but once that candidate is elected, you have no further control over your payoff. Your 
payoff in a given period depends entirely on the policy that the incumbent decides to 
adopt after he or she is elected. 
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One important rule of this experiment is that once we begin, no one is allowed to 
talk to anyone else. The only communication permitted is the communication that occurs 
over your computer terminals. The candidates are paid for their participation in the 
experiment on the basis of the number of elections that they win. Thus, each time a 
candidate is elected as the incumbent, he receives a fixed payoff. This will be 
displayed on the candidate's screen, and added to his cumulative total. Also note that in 
each period, the candidates, on their screens, learn only the total vote, not which voter 
voted for which candidate. Nor do candidates learn who or even how many voters 
purchased information. The payoffs of voters, as we have already stated, depend on the 
policy of the incumbent. No one including the candidates will be told, however, the 
relationship between policy and payoffs. And different voters may have different 
functions relating payoffs to policy. Thus, a particular policy may greatly benefit one 
voter but be strongly disliked by another. Voters will also not be told the maximum 
payoff possible in a period. The process we have described will continue for a fixed 
number of periods, or until a given time has elapsed. At this point, the first experiment 
will end, and you should each record your cumulative payoff on the sheet provided. 
Then, a second experiment will begin, which will be similar to the first, except that the 
function relating each voters' payoff to the incumbent's policy may be different than in 
the first experiment. Between each experiment voters will be shuffled and the candidates 
may be relabeled. So, for example, if candidate I wins many more elections in the first 
experiment, you should not suppose that letting 2 win more in the second will equalize 
payoffs --it may benefit the same person. 
After two experiments, the session will end and you will all be paid on the basis of 
the earnings you have accrued. To compute your total payment, add the amount you 
have earned from each of the two experiments, and multiply by the exchange rate, which 
is listed on your record sheet. Enter this amount in the final column of your record 
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sheet, and submit it to me to receive your payment. Before beginning the actual 
experiment, we will have a 5-period practice session. Also, the sample sheet before you 
gives you some idea what a voters terminal screen looks like. Various messages will 
appear at the bottom of the screen prompting you to vote or to decide whether or not 
to purchase information. The columns denote the period number, the vote totals of the 
two candidates, the winner, your payoff from the winner's policy (entered under either 
the column for I or for 2), and, if you purchased information in that period, the value 
of the promise of the challenger. You will not be paid for the trial session, although 
the payoffs you would receive if this were a real session will be computed. After the 
trial session, please ask questions. I would like to emphasize at this point that the 
number of rows on the screen should not be interpr!lted as limiting the number of 
periods in an actual experiment since data on the screen can scroll up an off the screen 
to make room for as many periods as we choose. 
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